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ABSTRACT
International health research increasingly depends on collaboration and
combination using medical data to advance treatment and drug discovery.
The European Union (EU), through its General Data Protection Regu-
lation, has tightened the rules for sharing data across borders to protect
individual privacy. These new rules threaten cooperation between the EU
and the USA, the two largest public funders of biomedical research. This
article analyzes the primary pathway for sharing research data with the
USA, the US–EU Privacy Shield††, and argues that the Shield is ill-suited
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The US and the EU are discussing replacement mechanisms. The aws of the Privacy Shield highlighted
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to support complex health studies. Its legitimacy is in question under both
EU and US law, and its terms are too restrictive for the variety of exchanges
underlying research, treatment, and care. As an alternative, we propose that
the USA seek an additional sector-based adequacy determination based on
the existing US health privacy law, the Health Insurance Portability and
AccountabilityAct. A sector-specic approach to adequacy for healthwould
avoid many of the most contentious issues that divide the USA and EU
on data protection. It could also serve as a model for other third-party
jurisdictions and facilitate international harmonization of health research
practices.
KEYWORDS:GDPR, privacy and data protection, cross-border transfers,
EU–US privacy shield, HIPAA
I. INTRODUCTION
The sharing of patient medical information is vital for research and drug discovery.
In an e ort to protect European Union (EU) data subjects’ privacy, the General Data
ProtectionRegulation (GDPR) enacted by the EU in 2016 places stringent restrictions
on international transfers of personal data, including data concerning health.The threat
of steep penalties for noncompliance have upended decades of accepted practice in
commercial and public health research between the EU and other major research
centers, especially the USA.1 In November 2019 the director of the US National
Institutes ofHealth, the largest public funder of biomedical studies in theworld, labeled
theGDPR ‘a serious impediment to research’ and said that progress on some important
projects had ‘slowed to a crawl’.2
The legal avenues for sharing personal health datawithUS entities under theGDPR
are dicult and uncertain. Increasing scrutiny of US law enforcement data collection
and surveillance practices led to the invalidation in 2015 of the US–EU Safe Harbor
which had previously allowed exchanges of commercial data between the two regions.3
As a fallback, theEuropeanCommission (EC) adopted a ‘limited adequacy’ decision in
2016 on the so-called ‘EU-US Privacy Shield Framework’.4 This Framework allows the
free transfer of personal data to companies that are certied under the EU–US Privacy
Shield. However, the EU–US Privacy Shield has been challenged as insuciently
protective of subject rights in the EU and is seen as overly restrictive and burdensome
on companies and federal agencies in the USA.5
1 Tania Rabesandratana, European data law is impeding studies on diabetes and Alzheimer’s, researchers
warn, Science Nov. 20, 2019.
2 Id.
3 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650,191 ¶ 28, 91 (Oct. 6, 2015) [hereinaer,
Schrems I].
4 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection by the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield, 2016 O.J. (L207), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/les/privacy-shield-adequacy-de
cisionen.pdf [hereinaer Privacy Shield Implementing Decision].
5 See, infra, text accompanying notes 71–136.
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This paper analyses the EU–US Privacy Shield Framework from both the EU and
the US perspective with particular attention to its suitability for transfers of health
data. We argue that the Privacy Shield functions poorly as a mechanism for facilitating
international health research and bioinnovation. It rests on an uncertain legal founda-
tion under both EU and US law. It is neither a treaty, nor a binding agreement, nor a
mandatory law; its status is therefore ambiguous under both the GDPR and the US
constitutional system. Its scope is also too narrow to support the diverse health care
research ecosystem.
Due to the importance of data transfers for public health and medical innovation,
we suggest that one way around the inadequacy of the Privacy Shield would be to
seek an additional sector-based adequacy determination based on the existing US
health privacy law, theHealth Insurance Portability andAccountability Act (HIPAA).6
A sector-specic approach to adequacy for health would avoid many of the most
contentious issues that divide the USA and EU on data protection. It could also serve
as amodel for other third-party jurisdictions and facilitate international harmonization
of health research practices.
Health care research is increasingly international and data intensive. Everything
fromgenomic research to adversedrug reaction testing to epidemiologydependson the
collection, linkage, and analyzation of diverse patient indicators and disease features.
Healthcare organizations are increasingly supplementing traditional controlled drug
discovery pipelines with distributed, collaborative, and iterative research methods that
demand large-scale combinations of patient data.7 Research studies, including clinical
trials, aim for an international scope, with results being compared and matched to
achieve greater statistical signicance.8 Genomic databases need to reect the genetic
diversity of patients across the world for their value to be maximized.9 Advances in
personalized medicine and use of algorithms in diagnosis and treatment depend on
the analysis of massive amounts of individual statistics. These include information
about risk factors, disease outcomes, lifestyle, genetics, environment, behavior, and
treatment responses.10 Huge collections of health-related data are shared continuously
6 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) P.L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat.
1938 (1996).
7 See Maria Angeles Martinez-Grau & Maria Alvim-Gaston, Powered by Open Innovation: Opportunities
and Challenges in the Pharma Sector, 33 Pharmaceutical Medicine 193, 194 (2019); Alexander Schuh-
macher, Oliver Gassman & Markus Hinder, Changing R&D Models in research-based pharmaceutical
companies, 14 J. Transl. Med. 105 (2016)
8 See, e.g., Timo Minssen et. al., The EU-US Privacy Shield Regime for Cross-Border Transfers of Personal
Data under the GDPR, 4 Eur. Pharm. L. Rev. 34, 36 (2020) (noting that multi-site trials is a necessity in
many clinical trials); Grau&Gaston, supra note 7 at 196 (describing Eli Lilly’s biological compound library
program under which it makes its privileged compounds available to scientic institutions for testing and
validation);Mark Phillips et al., Comment:Genomics: data sharing needs an international code of conduct,
578 Nature 31, 31 (Feb. 6, 2020) (describing large-scale cancer genomics collaboration which combined
data from 468 institutions in 34 countries).
9 Royal College of Pathologists and British Society for Genetic Medicine, Consent and condentiality in
genomic medicine: Guidance on the use of genetic and genomic information in the clinic, Report of the
Joint Committee on Genomics in Medicine 24 (London: RCP, RCPath and BSGM, 3rd ed. 2019).
10 See K.S. Cheung et al., Big data in gastrointestinal research, 25 World J. Gastroenterol. 2990, 2991, 2992,
2999 (Jun. 28, 2019); see also TimoMinssen et al., Clinical trial data transparency andGDPR compliance:
Implications for data sharing and open innovation, Working Paper at 3-4 (forthcoming: Science & Public
Policy (Oxford University Press 2019)).
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among commercial organizations, states, and state actors such as public health bodies,
universities, and research laboratories.
Di erences in the data protection regimes between the USA and the EU threaten
to throttle these exchanges.11 Europe and the USA provide the lion’s share of public
funding for health research12 and most of the major pharmaceutical companies have
large research campuses in one or both jurisdictions.13 Exchanges of patient and pop-
ulation health-related data between the two regions are vital for continued innovation
in treatments and public health.
The circumstancesunderwhichorganizationsmaywish to exchangepersonal health
data across theAtlantic are various.Multinational pharmaceutical companiesmay need
to send data about drug safety and ecacy in certain populations to subsidiaries and
aliates in other jurisdictions. A clinical research organization managing a clinical
trial may need to share outcome data with partners and sponsors located overseas.
Researchers inNorth Americamay seek to access sample or population data, including
identifying phenotype characteristics, held in European biobanks, or vice versa.14
Makers of medical devices or academic researchers may need to store patient data with
cloud service providers whose servers are located in a di erent jurisdiction.15
Presently the EU–US Privacy Shield is the legal basis for many of these transfers.
In section II (legal overview), we describe the legal framework that currently applies
to transfers of personal health data from the EU to the USA. As well as important
informational background, this section has an overarching purpose for our argument.
It demonstrates the seriousness of the policy issue, rst by explaining how the GDPR
a ectsUS-based companies notwithstanding that it is European legislation and second
by explaining why the EU–US privacy shield oen comes into play, even though
technically, there are other lawful bases such as binding corporate rules (BCRs) or
standard contractual clauses (SCCs) for transferring personal health data from the EU
to the USA.
In section III (explanation of EU–USPrivacy Shield and its limitations), we provide
further information about the operation of the EU–US Privacy Shield. As well as
analyzing adequacy from the EU perspective, this article is the rst to look at the
legitimacy of the Privacy Shield from the US vantage point, both in terms of its origins
and its operation. From theEUside, thePrivacy Shield lacks the force ofmandatory law,
whichwould seem to be a prerequisite for an adequacy determination, under Article 45
of the GDPR. It is also subject to multiple legal challenges due to alleged deciencies
in the underlying US legal regime. From the USA side, the Privacy Shield essentially
requires US agencies to enforce EU law and so is more restrictive than an adequacy
decision based on domestic US law. The authority of individual federal agencies to
11 Rabesandratana, supra note 1; see also Phillips et al., supra note 8 at 32 (describing data access hurdles for
US researchers participating in an international cancer genomics study that caused the US researchers to
remain “conceptually split o  from the rest of the project”).
12 R.F. Viergever, &T.C.C.Hendriks, The 10 largest public and philanthropic funders of health research in the
world: what they fund and how they distribute their funds. Health Res Policy Sys 14, 12 (2016), https://
doi.org/10.1186/s12961-015-0074-z.
13 E.g. Schuhmacher et al., supra note 7 at 8.
14 Royal College of Pathologists, supra note 8 at 24.
15 Cf. Phillips et al., supra note 8 at 31–32 (discussing the use of cloud computing services in a large-scale
cancer genomics study).
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agree to such enforcement commitments independent of Congressional approval or
a negotiated treaty is also a concern. Finally, the Privacy Shield aims primarily at
commercial transfers of data and so is ill-suited to serve as the primary mechanism for
transfers of data concerning health within the highly regulated medical sector.
In section IV (HIPAA as possible solution), we argue that one way to overcome the
problems with the EU–US privacy shield for EU–US transfers of health data would
be to ask Europe to give a sector specic adequacy decision for the existing US health
privacy law, HIPAA. A HIPAA shield would not replace the EU–US privacy shield,
nor SCCs, BCRs or informed consent. It would be an additional legal basis for lawful
international transfer of personal health data. In this section we briey outline the
advantages that the HIPAA shield would have over the EU–US privacy shield such
as greater democratic legitimacy, a targeted health data focus; and harmonization with
an existing and tested legal framework. We also discuss whether HIPAA would likely
meet the ‘adequacy’ standard, and the modications that are likely to be required. We
consider several challenges posed by such an approach and possible alternatives.
II. THECURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKFOR INTERNATIONAL
TRANSFERSOF PERSONALHEALTHDATA FROMTHEEUTOTHEUSA
TheGDPR’s reach is vast. The law can apply directly tomany entities based in theUSA
even if they have no operations in the EU and arguably even if they are not processing
EU subject data. Under Article 3, the GDPR applies to any processing of personal data
‘in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or processor in the
Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not’.16 It is
possible then that any commercial or research collaboration anywhere in the world
in which an EU-established entity participates is governed by the GDPR. This would
be the case even if the data analyzed does not relate to EU subjects.17 Furthermore,
the GDPR applies directly to non-EU entities who o er goods and services to data
subjects in the EU or who monitor subject behavior taking place within the Union.18
Although this last provision seems targeted at companies who monitor behavior for
advertising andmarketing purposes, its reach can extend to pharmaceutical companies
and researchers monitoring patient reactions to a drug.19
To further ensure that the protection guaranteed by the GDPR is not undermined,
the regulation restricts transfers of personal data to countries outside the EU and the
European EconomicArea (EEA). A ‘transfer’ of personal data occurs any time it is sent,
ormade accessible, to an outside receiver.20 If theGDPRdoes not apply directly to that
16 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation) Art. 3(1), 2016 OJ L 119, 04.05.2016;
cor. OJ L 127, 23.5.2018 (“GDPR”).
17 See EDPB, Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) 9–10 (2019), https://e
dpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/les/les/le1/edpb_guidelines_3_2018_territorial_scope_en.pdf .
18 GDPR Art 3(2).
19 See EDPB,Questions andAnswers on the interplay between theClinical Trials Regulation and theGeneral
Data Protection Regulation, 10 (2019).
20 Information Commissioner’s Oce, Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation GDPR: Interna-
tional Transfers https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-da
ta-protection-regulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). Note that transit of the
data via electronic routing through a third jurisdiction does not qualify as a restricted “transfer.”
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receiver because of its location, then both the processor and the controller of the data
must comply with the conditions specied in Chapter 5 of the GDPR.21
The potential sanctions for senders and recipients that fail to comply with Chapter
5 are onerous. A noncompliant transfer of personal data to a third country is one of the
infractions that invite the largest possible administrative penalty: up to e20,000,000
or four per cent of total worldwide annual turnover.22 In July 2019, for example, the
Marriott hotel group was ned £99 million pounds for a data breach incident that
exposed 339 million guest records globally, of which around 30 million related to
residents of 31 countries in the EEA.23
The landscape for transferring health data lawfully between the USA and EU is
disjointed and dicult to navigate, however. Biomedical researchers lack accepted
pathways to exchange patient health data impacted by the GDPR. The mechanisms
prescribed to facilitate such transfers, such as BCRs, SCCs and explicit consent, are
ill-suited to research scenarios and are burdensome to fulll even where they are
available.
Chapter 5 of the GDPR o ers three basic pathways for a legal international transfer
of data. These include:
1. Transfers on the basis of an ‘adequacy decision’ by the EC;24
2. Transfers subject to ‘appropriate safeguards’ by the controller/processor on
condition that enforceable data subject rights and e ective legal remedies
for data subjects are available;25 and
3. Derogations for specic situations.26
In e ect, these mechanisms are intended to ensure that either (i) the country
(adequacy decision) or (ii) the organization (appropriate safeguards with SCCs and
BCRs) ensure an appropriate level of data protection to the data subject. If none of
these routes are available, the only way to transfer data is either to seek the explicit
consent of the subject or to render thedata anonymous so that the rules of theGDPRno
longer apply.27
A. Transfers on the Basis of an ‘Adequacy Decision’
Pursuant to Article 45 GDPR, the EC has the power to determine whether a country
outside the EUo ers an adequate level of data protection. The e ect of these adequacy
decisions is that personal data can be transferred from the EU and the EEA to that
21 GDPR Art. 44.
22 GDPR Art 83(5).
23 Information Commissioner’s Oce, Statement: Intention to ne Marriott International, Inc more than
£99 million under GDPR for data breach (09 Jul. 2019), available at https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/ne
ws-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/07/statement-intention-to-ne-marriott-international-inc-more-
than-99-million-under-gdpr-for-data-breach/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
24 GDPR Art 45.
25 GDPR Art. 46 & 47.
26 GDPR Art. 49.
27 GDPR recital 26. Technically explicit consent of the subject is one of the derogations under Article 49, and
Article 49 places strict requirements on how that consent must be obtained. See infra text accompanying
notes 49–51.
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third country without any further safeguards.28 At the time of this writing, the EC has
recognizedAndorra, Argentina, Canada (for commercial organizations), Faroe Islands,
Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Uruguay as
providing adequate protection.29
TheUSA does not have a general adequacy decision as it lacks a federal general data
protection legislation. Instead, the USA has instituted the Privacy Shield framework as
a stopgap measure to allow transfers of data subject to the GDPR. As detailed further
in Part III, the Privacy Shield framework has been judged ‘adequate’ by the EU, though
it is subject to continuing judicial and administrative assessment.
B. Transfers Pursuant to Safeguards
In the absence of an Article 45 adequacy decision, the GDPR allows transfers of
personal data outside the EU pursuant to various safeguard mechanisms specic to
individual organizations under Article 46. These safeguards are applied on a case-by-
case basis, under the guidance of one ormore of the EUmember states’ data protection
authorities (DPA) and are subject to their nal approval.30 The main ones are SCCs
and BCRs.31
BCRs allow multinational companies to move data globally within a group of
aliated entities. Tomake use of the safeguard, a controller, or processor locatedwithin
the EUmust establish personal data protection policies consistent with the GDPR for
transfers within a single conglomerate or within a group of enterprises engaged in a
joint economic activity.32 The obligations must be legally binding on the recipients
and confer enforceable rights on data subjects.33
SCCs allow the transfer of personal data outside of the EU to a company that
accepts the terms of standard form clauses previously approved by the EC.34 These
clauses require the data importer’s agreement to the data protection law of the exporter
in processing the data, to name data subjects as third party beneciaries under the
contract, and to agree to answer for breaches in a court of amember state.35 Theymust
be used exactly in the approved form unless an amendment is approved in advance by
a DPA.36
28 GDPR recital 103.
29 See Adequacy Decisions, Eur. Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/
data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacy-protection-personal-data-non-eu-countries en (last visited Dec. 31,
2019) (listing Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faroe Island, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New
Zealand, Switzerland, and Uruguay). The United States is also listed; however, its adequacy nding is
"limited to the Privacy Shield framework." Id.
30 Jennifer Stoddart, Benny Chan, and Yann Joly, The European Union’s Adequacy Approach to Privacy and
International Data Sharing in Health Research 44 J. LawMed. Ethics, 143, 146 (2016).
31 Articles 40, 42 and 46 also provides for approved codes of conduct and certication schemes. However, to
date there are no approved codes of conduct for international data transfers.
32 GDPR Article 47.
33 GDPR Article 47.2
34 GDPR Art. 46.2(c).
35 CommissionDecisionof 5February2010on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to
processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council (notied under document C(2010) 593) (2010/87/EU)) available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32010D0087&from=en.
36 GDPR Recital 109.
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C. Transfers Pursuant to Derogations
The nal category of permitted international transfers is derogations for specic sit-
uations.37 Under the GDPR, the main ones are: consent by the data subject, transfers
necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller,
or transfers necessary for the purposes of a legitimate interest pursued by the controller,
which is available only aer all other options have been tried and only for limited and
infrequent transfers.38
D. Transfers andHealth Data Under Chapter 5 of the GDPR
None of these mechanisms are ideally suited to transfers of medical data for research
purposes. BCRs are a useful tool formultinationals to share data with aliates.Outside
of this scenario they have limited utility. Health organizations such as a national health
service or university are not engaged in ‘joint economic activity’ with their research
partners and so fail to qualify for BCRs. The task of writing an internal corporate code
and obtaining approval from the relevant DPA is too expensive and time-consuming to
pursue for temporary alliances, trials, or one-o  exchanges.39 BCRs therefore cannot
facilitate most research combinations of data between multinationals, SMEs, health
care organizations, and service providers.
SCCs also are problematic. Because model SCCs have to be written to cover every
kind of data transfer, they contain terms too onerous for specic research purposes and
relationships.40 Parties may not negotiate any change, however without seeking ocial
approval.41 The three existing approved clauses apply only where an EU controller is
exporting data,42 and so cannot be used by EU processors looking to provide derived
or observational data to controllers in the USA. The substantive terms of the clauses
are also dicult for many US health processors. US public health bodies are not
permitted to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of foreign states as required by the
clauses.43 Furthermore, standard US commercial insurance policies limit coverage to
claims brought in US courts44 and so would not cover any liabilities arising under an
37 GDPR Article 49
38 GDPR Article 49.1.
39 AadityaMattoo& Joshua P.Meltzer, International Data Flows and Privacy: TheConict and its Resolution
11 (World Bank Group Policy ResearchWorking Paper No. 8431 2018).
40 See Ropes & Gray, The GDPR One Year On (2019) available at https://www.ropesgray.com/en/ne
wsroom/alerts/2019/07/GDPR-One-Year-On;Mattoo &Melzer, supra note 39 at 11.
41 ColinMitchell, JohanOrdish&AlisonHall, GenomicMedicine and research: how does theGDPR apply?,
20 (2020) www.phgfoundation.org.
42 Commission Decision 2010/87/ of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of
personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council (notied under document C(2010) 593) 2010 O.J. L 39, 5 (12.2.2010);
Commission Decision 2004/915/EC of 27 December 2004 amending Decision 2001/497/EC as regards
the introduction of an alternative set of standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to
third countries 2004 O.J. L 385, 74; Commission Decision 2001/497/EC of 15 June 2001 on standard
contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC, 2001
O.J. L 181, 19.
43 Rabesandratana, supra note 1.
44 SeeMarianne Bonner, Coverage Territory: what is it? The Balance Small Business ( Jan. 23, 2019) https://
www.thebalancesmb.com/coverage-territory-462649 (“For a suit to be covered under the CGL, it must be
brought in the U.S.A. (including its territories or possessions), Puerto Rico or Canada.”) (last visited Feb.
4, 2020).
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SCC,which requires signatories to agree tobe sued in the courts of the relevantMember
state.45 The clauses themselves were written over a decade ago under the GDPR’s
predecessor law and so imperfectly describe the controller–processor relationship.46
Finally, the EU Advocate General examining a case (Schrems II) challenging SCCs
withUS entities has suggested that even when the approved SCCs are used, controllers
must still conduct a context-specic inquiry into the underlying legal framework in the
recipient state to ensure that the protections of the clauses are not undermined by local
laws.47 This case presents a particular risk for transfers to the USA under SCCs due
to continuing concerns about structural deciencies in US privacy law that potentially
allow unduly extensive surveillance for the purposes of national security.48
The derogations under Article 49 are also quite limited. Article 49 (1) (a) states
that a transfer of personal data to a third country may be made in the absence of
an adequacy decision or of appropriate safeguards on the condition that ‘the data
subject has explicitly consented to the proposed transfer, aer having been informed
of the possible risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an
adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards’.49 Valid consent under this sectionmust
be specic and informed. This means that to provide a basis for transfer, consent must
be given for the particular data transfer or set of transfers aer the data subject is
explicitly informed of the details of the transfers and the risks inherent to that specic
transfer.50 This is a dicult burden to meet for large-scale repositories of patient data
typical in clinical trials and medical research studies that may be held for years and
combinedwith other sources for new studies not anticipated at the date of collection.51
Similarly, ‘necessary for performance of contract’ is unlikely to apply as a basis for
medical data transfer. In most cases, health data controllers based in the public sector
are unlikely to have a commercial contract with patients or research subjects. Even
where one does exist (for example, where a contract exists between a health app and
a customer), the controller would have to show that the transfer of data overseas had a
close and substantial link to the contract’smainpurpose.52Thebusiness convenienceof
the controller is not sucient.53 Finally, for sensitive health data, controllers still must
45 Mitchell et al. supra note 41 at 20.
46 Ropes & Gray, supra note 40.
47 SeeOpinion of the Advocate General, Data ProtectionCommissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd ¶¶ 127-139
(Dec. 19, 2019).
48 Id. at ¶¶ 40, 152.
49 GDPR Art. 49(1)(a).
50 Guidelines 2/2018 of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) on derogations of Article 49 under
Regulation 2016/679 7 (May 25, 2018) available at https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/les/les/le1/e
dpb_guidelines_2_2018_derogations_en.pdf ; see also EC Commission Directorate-General for Health
and Food Safety, Questions on the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation and the General Data
Protection Regulation 9 https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/les/les/documents/qa_clinicaltria
ls_gdpr_en.pdf .
51 Guidelines 2/2018, supra note 50 at 7.
52 See Guidelines 2/2019 of the EDPB on the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in
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demonstrate compliance with one of the additional heightened legal bases set out in
Article 9(2)(b)–(j) notwithstanding anything in a contract.54
The ability to transfer data pursuant to a legitimate interest is also heavily circum-
scribed. First, the data transfermust be infrequent and limited in size, so this derogation
could not be used to justify any activity that relies on regular data collection.55 The
legitimate interests necessary to justify the transfer must be more than the regular
legitimate interests basis for processing under Article 6; the transfer must be ‘essential’
for the data controller and outweigh any ‘competing’ interests of the data subject.56
Where entities seek to use this derogation, theymust demonstrate that they have put in
place appropriate safeguards andmeasures to protect the data subject’s rights andmust
inform the EU supervisory authority and the data subject of the transfer of data.57
E. Anonymization
Anonymization of data places it outside the requirements of data protection legisla-
tion and so has long been the pathway of choice for sharing medical research data.
Unfortunately, there is no clarity as to when health patient datasets may be consid-
ered anonymized under the GDPR. Biometric and whole genome sequence data are
inherently unique to each natural subject, and thus at least potentially identiable.58 It
is an open question whether individuation itself in data renders it ‘identiable’.59 The
GDPR links the assessment of identiability to available technology.60 Improvements
in technology have made reidentication of even small amounts of genetic material
more likely.61 The GDPR is also unclear on whether common deidentication tech-
niques, such as unique identier codes held separately from the code key, are sucient
to render such data anonymous, or merely pseudonymized in which case the data
would still be subject to the GDPR.62 Furthermore, strict anonymization may render
the data functionally useless for research as the most useful datasets for research are
the ones that contain the greatest depth of detail about each subject.63 Insucient
deidentication, on the other hand, carries legal and reputational risks, as a Chicago
hospital recently learned when it shared what it thought was anonymous patient data
with Google.64 In this environment, many health organizations err on the side of
54 Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679 (WP259) at 19 (Apr. 10,
2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=623051.
55 GDPR Art. 49(1) §2.
56 EDPB, Guidelines 2/2018 supra note 50 at 15–16.
57 Id. at 17.
58 E.g. GDPR Art. 4.14 (dening biometric data as personal data); Justin Banda, Inherently identiable: Is it
possible to anonymize health and genetic data?, IAPP Privacy Perspectives (Nov. 13, 2019) https://iapp.
org/news/a/inherently-identiable-is-it-possible-to-anonymize-health-and-genetic-data/.
59 See, e.g., Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 ¶¶ 114-15; Bridges v. Chief Constable of Wales
Police, [2019] EWHC 2341 ¶ 57 (2019).
60 GDPR Recital 26.
61 Mark Philips, CanGenetic Data Be Anonymised? Global Alliance for Genomics &Health (Oct. 10, 2018).
62 GDPR Article 4(5) & Recitals 26, 28 78.
63 ColinMitchell, JohanOrdish&AlisonHall, GenomicMedicine and research:when does theGDPRapply?
7Phg foundation (Jan. 2020) available atwww.phgfoundation.org;R.Neethu&TimoMinssen,What lurks
in the shadows of the openness hyperbole for biopharmaceuticals, 80 Drug. Dev. Res. 282, 283 (2019).
64 Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Dinerstein v. Google, LLC Case: 1:19-cv-04311 ¶¶
5-6 (6/26/19).
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caution, and treat all patient data as personal unless and until a supervisory authority
assures them otherwise.65
F. Research Exemption
The GDPR o ers expansive exemptions from notice and consent requirements where
processing of personal health data is done for the purpose of scientic research in
the public interest.66 These research exemptions apply only within the supporting
framework of EU or Member state law, however. 67 They cannot form the basis for a
transfer of data to a jurisdiction where the laws are insuciently protective. Indeed,
as discussed further in Part III.E, US entities certied under the Privacy Shield must
still comply with notice and consent requirements to use EU subject data in further
research.68
G. Summary
To illustrate the potential risks of undertaking an international transfer of data under
the current system, consider the examples from the introduction:
(1) Amultinational pharmaceutical company sending data about drug safety
and ecacy in certain populations to subsidiaries and aliates in other
jurisdictions;
(2) A clinical research organization managing a clinical trial in the EUmay need
to share outcome data with a US sponsor;
(3) Researchers in North America may seek to access sample or population
data, including identifying phenotype characteristics, held in European
biobanks, or vice versa;
(4) Makers of medical devices in the EU storing and accessing patient data
through cloud storage providers whose servers are located in the USA.
Of these four common scenarios, only the rst may denitely rely on an Article 46
safeguard (eg SCCs or BCRs), and even then, only aer that safeguard has received
approval from a supervisory authority. For the reasons detailed below, the other trans-
fers will likely fail or be prohibitively dicult under Articles 46–49. Furthermore,
65 Mitchell et al., supra note 63 at 9.
66 GDPRArt. 6 (setting out lawful bases for processing, including consent and research in the public interest),
9.2 (h)(i)& (j) (allowing use of sensitive personal data for reasons of health or social care, protecting public
health and for scientic research regardless of the non-prot status of the processor); Recital 159 (“For
the purposes of this Regulation, the processing of personal data for scientic research purposes should
be interpreted in a broad manner including for example technological development and demonstration,
fundamental research, applied research and privately funded research.”)
67 GDPRArt. 9.2(h)-(j) (allowing processing of sensitive data for the purposes of public health and scientic
research so long as the processing is “based on Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate
to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specic
measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.”)
68 United States Department of Commerce, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the U.S.
Department ofCommerce, Supplemental Principles 14 https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=14-Pha
rmaceutical-and-Medical-Products [hereinaer Privacy Shield Principles].
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depending on the outcome of the Schrems II decision, even SCCs may no longer be
available as a mechanism to transfer data to the USA.
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) is currently working on guidance
for international transfers which may provide greater clarity on some of these issues.69
Until then, the Privacy Shield is the most promising means for transfers of health data
between the USA and EU but even that is problematic.
III. THE EU–US PRIVACY SHIELD
The US–EU Privacy Shield itself rests on a tenuous legal foundation. Although trade
between the USA and the EU is extensive, nding common ground for treatment of
consumer data has never been easy. The two regions approach the concept of personal
privacy di erently. Privacy of personal data is enshrined as a fundamental right in the
EU Charter.70 Trading in identiable data is therefore forbidden in the EU unless a
lawful basis applies.71 In the USA, by contrast, certain forms of privacy are protected
by law, but these are balanced against equally strong constitutional regard for free and
unfettered speech, including commercial ‘speech’.72 In the USA, transfers of personal
data are presumptively legal unless a particular prohibition applies.73 Froma regulatory
standpoint, the USA favors a market-based approach wherein customers can choose
levels of privacy as part of the product or service o ered by a company.74
The Privacy Shield o ers an uneasy compromise between the privacy absolutism of
the GDPR and the more laissez-faire, self-regulatory approach of the USA. The Shield
is an opt-in mechanism that allows US companies that want to receive transfers of per-
sonal information from EU subjects to self-certify as meeting certain standards.75 Var-
ious arms of the US federal government have pledged to enforce those commitments,
at least with respect to EU subjects.76
As an awkward hybrid of voluntary, private commitments and mandatory, public
laws, the Privacy Shield’s legal validity is doubtful under both EU andUS law. From the
EU side, it is vulnerable to court challenge that it does not o er adequate protection
under the GDPR, both due to US law enforcement collection of personal data, and
because enforcement of the Principles has been lax. From the US side, the Privacy
Shield requires extensive EU monitoring and oversight of domestic federal agencies
and requires the US government to create special mechanisms for EU subjects that
are unavailable to US citizens. Critics contend that it neither assures adequate data
69 United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Oce, Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation,
International Transfers: In more detail - European Data Protection Board, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisa
tions/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/international-tra
nsfers/ (visited Feb. 27, 2020).
70 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Arts 7, 8.1, 2000 O.J C 364/10, [hereinaer
Charter]; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 16,
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinaer TFEU].
71 Charter Art. 52(1).
72 Paul Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Pfeifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 Geo. L.J. 115, 134 (2017).
73 Id. at 135.
74 Id. at 132.
75 Privacy Shield Principles, supra note 68 at 1.
76 Id. at 8-14, 24, Annex 1.
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protection for EU subjects, nor preserves US sovereignty over its own commercial data
protection policy.77
The Privacy Shield is an especially a poor t for the health care sector. It omits
from its coverage nonprot research centers and health insurance providers, twomajor
players in theUS healthcare economy.78 It also imposes special burdens onUSmedical
research entities that are not required of similar enterprises within the EU. The Shield
was designed to address concerns about law enforcement spying and internet platform
monitoring that are not relevant to most transfers of health data.
A. TheOrigins of the Privacy Shield
The Privacy Shield was created and implemented as a stopgap. OnOctober 6, 2015 the
Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the Safe Harbor Agree-
ment, the framework that had allowed transatlantic exchanges of data for 15 years.79
The Court found that the protections in the Safe Harbor were inadequate in light
of the Snowden revelations that US law enforcement and national security agencies
were obtaining and monitoring identiable signal data obtained by US companies.80
The Schrems I decision sent US and EU ocial scrambling to put a replacement
framework in place to avoid destabilizing trillions of dollars in EU–US trade in goods
and services.81 Just under 3 months later, on February 2, 2016, the US Department of
Commerce (DoC) issued the Privacy Shield Principles.
To rely on Privacy Shield to transfer commercial data from the EU, participating
organizations must self-certify to the US DoC their adherence to 23 principles laying
out the requirements for theuse and treatment of personal data received from theEU, as
well as access requests and recourse mechanisms for EU citizen complaints.82 The EC
declared on July 12, 2016 that organizations that are Privacy Shield-certied provide
‘adequate’ privacy protection to personal data transferred outside of the EU under the
EUData Protection Directive, which has since been superseded by GDPR.83
Like the Safe Harbor before it, the Privacy Shield depends on the voluntary partic-
ipation of US companies. Once a company enters the program, however compliance
is compulsory.84 An organization’s failure to comply is subject to prosecution under
Section5of theFederalTradeCommission(FTC)Actprohibitingunfair anddeceptive
acts in or a ecting commerce.85
B. The Privacy Shield Framework Under EU Law
Notwithstanding the Commission’s 2016 decision, the adequacy of the Privacy Shield
under the GDPR is far from evident. Formally, the Shield provides a lawful basis for
transfer under Article 45 of the GDPR, which allows transfers to foreign jurisdictions
77 See text accompanying notes 87-119 infra.
78 See BBMI-ERIC FAQs on the GDPR V2.0 18 (2017) http://www.bbmri-eric.eu/wp-content/uploads/
BBMRI-ERIC_FAQs_on_the_GDPR_V2.0.pdf .
79 Schrems I, supra note 3.
80 Id. at ¶ 94.
81 Mattoo &Meltzer, supra note 39 at 4.
82 Privacy Shield Principles, supra note 68.
83 Commission Implementing Decision supra note 4.
84 Privacy Shield Principles, supra note 68 at 1.
85 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
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deemed to have ‘adequate’ legal regimes. In practice, however the Shield is not amanda-
tory legal regime. Instead it has the characteristics of the opt-in company safeguards
found in Article 46 of the GDPR, such as codes of conduct, certication schemes
and BCRs. Like these mechanisms, the Privacy Shield Principles apply only when
companies choose to participate.
It is unclear whether a voluntary opt-in regime can really meet the adequacy thresh-
oldunderArticle 45.Thepurposeof an adequacy inquiryunderArticle 45 is to examine
the law and practices of the third country as a whole to ensure that the legal framework
is suciently protective.86 Voluntary and individual corporate codes of practice are
not usually considered relevant. Even considered under Article 46, the Privacy Shield
does not meet the standards for organization-specic mechanisms. Article 46 requires
private entities to submit their chosen safeguards to initial approval and ongoing, direct
supervision by European DPA or their delegated bodies for validity.87 The Privacy
Shieldby contrast allowsUScompanies to self-certifywithout independent verication
even by US authorities.88 Enforcement of its terms is in practice le almost entirely
to private action—companies largely self-monitor compliance, and EU subjects must
formally complain directly to have access to the limited rights of redress under its terms.
There is reason to believe that dozens of companies have declared their activities to be
compliant with the Shield while not complying in fact.89 If challenged on this basis,
the Shield might be vulnerable to claim that it cannot o er ‘equivalent’ protection
to that found in the GDPR, the standard the CJEU laid down in Safe Harbor case
for ‘adequacy’, because it does not meet even the minimum standards set out for
functionally equivalent safeguard mechanisms under Article 46.90
The Shield is in more direct legal jeopardy in the EU from the second lawsuit by
Maximilian Schrems, the plainti  in the Safe Harbor case, alleging that the US has
not substantively improved its data protection practices since the Safe Harbor was
invalidated.91 Although the Schrems II lawsuit aims at SCCs rather than the Privacy
Shield, the allegations that intrusive US law enforcement practices undermine private
contractual commitments also implicate the viability of the Privacy Shield.92 There is
also a second French lawsuit directly challenging the Privacy Shield on these grounds
86 See, e.g., Opinion of the Advocate General, supra note 47 at ¶119; cf. Schrems I, supra note 3 at ¶ 74.
87 SeeGDPR §§ 40 (setting outminimum standards for codes of conduct), 41 (requiring ongoingmonitoring
of compliance with codes of conduct), 42 (setting out minimum certication standards and requiring
advance approval and periodic re-authorisation by a certication body before a certication may be used),
43 (setting out the duties of certication bodies to demonstrate expertise and monitor compliance with
certication schemes), 46 (requiring advance supervisory authority approval for standard contractual
clauses), 47 (requiring advance supervisory authority approval for binding corporate rules) 57 (requiring
supervisory authorities to
88 Privacy Shield Principles, supra note 68 at Supplemental Principles §§ 6, 7.
89 FabienTerpan, EU-USDataTransfer FromSafeHarbour toPrivacy Shield: Back to SquareOne, Eur. Papers
Vol. 3 1045, 1053 (2018).
90 Schrems I, supra note 3 at ¶¶ 73–74, 96 (standard for adequacy is equivalency); see alsoTerpan, supra note
90 at 1052 (validity of the new regime remains fragile).
91 Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems, 2018
O.J. C 249, 15–17 [hereinaer Schrems II].
92 Minssen et. al., supra note 8 at 41-43 (2020); see also Terpan, supra note 90 at 1053 (US public authorities
indiscriminately made use of the exemption from data protection for national security under the Safe
Harbor and there is little reason to believe practices have changed under the Privacy Shield.)
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that has been stayed pending the outcome of Schrems II.93 The plainti s in these cases
contend that the Privacy Shield o ers no improvements to the SafeHarbor regime that
are binding on national security services and so the legal framework in the USA is still
inadequate notwithstanding undertakings made by private businesses.94
The recentOpinionof theAdvocateGeneral (AG) inSchrems II, which is persuasive
but not binding on the CJEU, o ered some assurances that SCCs and the Privacy
Shield framework are not at immediate risk of being invalidated. The AG concluded
that the SCCmechanismwas overall adequate to protect fundamental rights of privacy
and suggested that the Court does not need to render judgment on the validity of
the EU–US Privacy Shield Framework to decide the case.95 However, the AG went
on to raise some concerns about whether the Privacy Shield Framework in general
met the adequacy threshold.96 Based on previous jurisprudence, the AG considered
that surveillance by US authorities was generally justied on the grounds of public
interest.97 He expressed reservations, however as to whether it contained adequate
safeguards enshrined in law to prevent the risks of abuse.98 The AG advised against
addressing these deciencies for the case and noted that supervisory authorities could
consider the necessity and proportionality principles as well as the fundamental right
to respect for a private life on a case-by-case basis with regard to transfers made
pursuant to SCCs.99 This emphasis on case-by-case inquiry, if adopted by the Court
and individual DPA, could undermine the eciency of general transfer mechanisms
such as SCCs and the Privacy Shield. Furthermore, the CJEU could still potentially
decide to invalidate theEU–USPrivacy Shield Framework in its decision in the Schrems
II case, or in the subsequent direct challenge.This possibility poses substantial legal risk
to companies currently relyingon the adequacyof thePrivacy Shieldmechanism. In the
meantime, the continued legal vulnerability of the regime under EU law has led many
US companies to delay undertaking the time and e ort required to certify under the
Shield.100
C. The Privacy Shield Under US Law
Nor does the Privacy Shield protect US interests in domestic policy sovereignty. Many
policymakers and industry representatives in the US think that its self-regulatory and
patchwork approach is more hospitable to innovation than the ‘one size ts all’ EU
privacy rules.101 They argue that data privacy experimentationmay promote advances
93 Case T-738/16 La Quadrature du Net v Commission (2017/C 006/49), ECLI:EU:T:2018:520 (4 Sept.
2018).
94 Case T-738/16 La Quadrature du Net v Commission (2017/C 006/49), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2017.006.01.0039.01.ENG.
95 See Opinion of the Advocate General, supra note 47 at ¶¶ 160, 182, 186
96 Id. at ¶¶ 308, 341, 342.
97 Id. at ¶¶ 282, 286.
98 Id. at ¶¶ 294-97.
99 Id. at 194.
100 Lothar Determan, Brian Hengesbaugh, & Michaela Weigl, The EU-US Privacy Shield Versus Other EU
Data Compliance Options, Privacy Law Watch (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.bna.com/uploadedFiles/
BNA_V2/Legal/Pages/Custom_Trials/BLPV/Tips_for_US_Companies_EU_GDPR_Privacy_Shie
ld_nal.pdf .
101 MartinA.Weiss&KristinArchik,US-EUData Privacy: FromSafeHarbor to Privacy Shield, Congressional
Research Service 7-5700 R442574 (May 19, 2016) (“Many US ocials and industry representatives
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in the information technology and internet commerce sectors,whereasblanket prohibi-
tions stie technologyrms.102TheUSAhas therefore beenwaryof saddling itselfwith
complex and burdensome data protection rules before their utility has been proven.
Ironically, then, the decision to operate via the Privacy Shield undermines the
ability of US companies to experiment, at least with respect to any data originating
from the EU. US companies that choose to receive data under the Privacy Shield
are e ectively promising to follow EU law. By contrast, companies in Israel, Canada,
Japan, and Argentina, to name a few, can process EU data under their own law without
regard to the GDPR because their governments applied for and received an ‘adequacy’
determination under Article 45 of the GDPR. The laws of many of these ‘adequate’
jurisdictions di er in material respects from the GDPR but the EU has been willing to
tolerate divisions in approach so long as the overall scheme achieves the aims of data
protection.103 US companies are therefore at a comparative disadvantage because they
have to assume the signicant costs of compliancewithUS laws and theGDPRwhereas
their international counterparts follow only domestic law. Furthermore, because the
Privacy Shield is nominally a ‘voluntary’ regime, US companies lack the support of
domestic information agencies helping to interpret any ambiguity in the rules, and
so must absorb completely as a private expense the legal compliance costs associated
with a new and untested regime.104 Companies certied under the Shield also face
the threat of investigation from multiple jurisdictions as they are subject to enforce-
ment not only from the FTC but also individual EU DPA.105 Companies in coun-
tries that have received adequacy determinations, by contrast, are free to receive data
from EU subjects under their own laws without further interference or annual audits
from the EU.106
The US government is under a similarly tight leash. The Commission’s 2016 US
adequacy decision for the Privacy Shield was tentative at best, and its continuation
dependson theUS federal agencies submitting annually todetailed audits by theEC.107
The Commission is empowered to investigate the functioning of all aspects of the
maintain that the US approach to data privacy is more nimble than what they view as the EU’s one size
ts all approach.”).
102 Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 73 at 157 (2017); Weiss & Archik, supra note 102 at 4; Thomas Davenport,
Should the US adopt European-style Data Privacy Protections: No, Stronger Privacy Rules Could Squelch
Innovation Wall St J R.7 (Mar. 10, 2013); Natasha Singer, Data Protection Laws, An Ocean Apart, N.Y.
Times Feb. 2, 2013 at B3.
103 See text accompanying notes 177- 191, infra.
104 Kirk J.Nahra, Impact of theUS-EUPrivacy Shield onHealth-CareDataTransfers (Bloomberg Law Insights
Aug. 1, 2016) (stating that the Privacy Shield is a ‘signicant mountain to climb for companies new to the
program.’) reprinted in Tips For US Companies in the Age of E.U. GDPR and Privacy Shield, supra note
101.
105 Privacy Shield Principles, supra note 68 at §11(a).
106 E.g. Opinion 28/2018 Regarding the European Commission Dra Implementing Decision on the
Adequate Protection of Personal Data in Japan, Eur. Data Protection Board (Dec. 5, 2018), https://e
dpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/les/les/lel/2018-12-05-opinion_2018-28_art.70_japan-adequacy-en.
pdf . P 181. (requiring one review aer two years, and periodic reviews of Japan’s regime every 4 years
thereaer); See also, Gabor Gerenscar, The European Union and Japan adopt adequacy decisions, IAPP
https://iapp.org/news/a/the-european-union-and-japan-adopt-adequacy-decisions/ (Jan. 24, 2019).
107 See, e.g., Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the rst annual
reviewof the functioningof theEU-USPrivacyShield at 2COM(2017)611nal (18.10.2017) (hereinaer
“First Annual Report”).
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Privacy Shield including enforcement statistics, key stang decisions and updates on
any relevant development under US law.108 At the rst annual review, the Commission
issued 10 detailed recommendations for improvement to the management of the
scheme.109 For the second and third annual reviews, the EC sought information not
only from theDoCand the FTC, the agencies taskedwith enforcing the Shield, but also
sent questionnaires to 10 US trade associations and eight NGOs to get a broad picture
of the practical implementation of the Privacy Shield framework by private entities.110
The Commission has sought several substantive changes in the way that the DoC and
the FTC implement the scheme, including more interrogation of certication claims,
more spot checks on continued compliance, and more proactive investigations of false
claims of compliance.111 The EC has been vocal that making these changes is vital to
the Shield’s continued adequacy.112
The authority of DoC and the FTC to make such extensive commitments on
behalf of non-US citizens is unclear. As federal agencies, the DoC and the FTC can
exercise only those powers specically granted by the Constitution to the executive
branch or delegated by Congress.113 If the Privacy Shield is a voluntary scheme for
private companies, then development of the Privacy Shield Framework falls within the
DoC’s inherent mandate to foster and promote international commerce.114 However,
the Framework, at least as interpreted by the EU, goes beyond setting out optional
requirements for private companies. It also obligates agencies of the federal government
to undertake particular actions outside their usual remit. These include, for the DoC,
the duty to monitor whether US companies publish their privacy commitments,115 to
conduct periodic compliance reviews116 and audits of listed anddelisted companies,117
and tomanage the establishment of special tribunals (‘Privacy Shield Panels’) available
only to EU residents.118
108 Id. at 2-7; Commission Sta  Working Document Accompanying the document, Report From The Com-
missionToThe European Parliament AndTheCouncil on the third annual review of the functioning of the
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 25-27 COM(2019) 495 nal (23.10.2019) (hereinaer, “Third Review Working
Document”).
109 First Annual Report, at 2–7.
110 Third Review Working Document, supra note 109 at 3; Commission Sta  Working Document accompa-
nying Report from the EC to the Parliament on the second annual review of the functioning of the EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield 2 COM(2018) 860 nal (19.12.2018) (hereinaer “Second ReviewWorking Document”).
111 Third ReviewWorking Document supra note 109 at 9-12; Second ReviewWorking Document supra note
111 at 3–5, 8.
112 Report FromThe Commission To The European Parliament And The Council on the third annual review
of the functioning of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 4 COM(2019) 495 nal (23.10.2019) [hereinaer Third
Annual Report]; see also Third Review Working Document supra note 109 at 12 (“Commission services
therefore consider that the FTC should, as a matter of priority, nd ways to share meaningful information
on ongoing investigations with the Commission as well as with EUDPAs.”)
113 US Const. Art II §2; J.W. Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
114 15 U.S.C. § 1512.
115 Commission Implementing Decision, supra note 4 at P. 32; Third ReviewWorking Document supra note
109 at 9–10.
116 Third Annual Report, supra note 113 at 4.
117 Commission Implementing Decision (EU), supra note 4 at P 35, 37.
118 Privacy Shield Principles, supra note 68 at 11(d)(iv) &Annex 1.While the tribunals are nominally selected
and fundedby individual companies operatingunder theShield,DoCcommits itself tounusual actions such
as selecting a panel of arbitrators and negotiating the rules for such arbitration with the EU Commission,
and establishing and running a fund to pay for the tribunals. Id. at Annex 1 § F.
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The FTC, the agency charged with enforcing Privacy Shield commitments made by
private entities, has broad enforcement authority but is similarly overextended by the
EU’s demands. The FTC has the power under its originating act to police deceptive
conduct in interstate commerce. The US courts have tended to take a permissive
stance on the question of whether the FTC’s enforcement power extends to conduct
directed at overseas markets. In Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, a case concerning
misrepresentations about a correspondence course o ered only to students in Latin
America, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that enforcement fell within the
Agency’s authority because (i) the deception was conceived and initiated within the
USA and (ii) the agency’s mandate to ensure a level playing eld for the company’s
competitors within the USA included preventing deception targeted to overseas cus-
tomers.119 Similarly, the FTC’s Privacy Shield enforcement ensures fair competition
among domestic companies who seek to process EU personal data. Companies that
do not comply gain an unfair advantage and risk undermining the credibility of the
whole scheme.120 However, certain agency obligations, as interpreted by the EC, seem
to reach beyond this limited authority. These include a commitment by the FTC to
priority review of EU complaints of noncompliance121 and, according to the EC, an
obligation to undertake proactive ex ocio sweeps of listed companies without any
basis for believing deceptive conduct has occurred.122 Such promises force the FTC
to prioritize EU privacy misrepresentations over other kinds of deceptive conduct
and to commit scarce enforcement resources for the sole benet of citizens of foreign
states. These state-to-state commitments arguably fall well outside §5’s remit, and
should require specic congressional approval under the Art II Treaty Power of the US
Constitution.123 Perhaps for this reason, theUS agencies have sullenly resistedmeeting
119 Branch v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 141 F.2d 31, 34–35 (7th Cir. 1944).
120 Cf., Hayley Evans & Shannon Togawa Mercer, Privacy Shield on Shaky Ground—What’s Up with EU-US
Data Privacy Regulations, Lawfare Blog available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/privacy-shield-shaky-
ground-whats-eu-us-data-privacy-regulations (last visited Dec. 9, 2019) (Actions against companies that
fraudulently claim to be certied when they are not prevent bad actors from undermining the credibility of
the whole framework).
121 Commission Implementing Decision supra note 4 at ¶ 54; Privacy Shield Principles, supra note 68 at
§11(f)(ii).
122 Third Annual Report, supra note 113 at 5.
123 There are three ways that the executive branch of the US government may make binding agreements with
foreign powers.UnderArticle II of theUSConstitution, the President can negotiate a treatywhich becomes
e ective upon ratication by two thirds of the Senate.USConst. Art. II §2.ThePresidentmay also negotiate
undertakings that are ratied by a majority vote in both houses of Congress. Michael D. Ramsey, Executive
Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 133, 135 (1998). Finally, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the President may enter into binding executive agreements by virtue of the President’s
inherent power in foreign a airs. Id. The Privacy Shield does not qualify as a treaty or undertaking ratied
by Congress. It might be an executive agreement negotiated by the Department of Commerce. However,
executive agencies may not commit funds or other national resources without Congressional approval, nor
may they usurpCongress’ authority to legislate domestically. Louis Henkin, Treaties, the Treaty Power, and
Executive Agreements 206-07, 229 (Oxford UP, 1996) (“If a treaty entails domestic regulation and legal
consequence in the United States, and is not self-executing, or if it requires appropriation of funds, the
President has to seekCongressional action”); see alsoRamsey, supra at 138 (changes to domestic legislation
require Congressional approval); Saikrishna B. Prakash andMichael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
ForeignA airs, 3 Yale L.J. 231, 235 (2001) (stating that the executive’s foreign a airs power does not extend
to domestic lawmaking); Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: the EU Way, 94 NYU L. Rev. 771, 805
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the EC’s demands for enhanced enforcement e orts, and so have further imperiled the
‘adequacy’ of the scheme under the GDPR.124
D. Unsuitability of the Privacy Shield for Transfers of Health Data
The Privacy Shield is not even useful as a temporary stopgap for many exchanges of
healthcare data between the USA and the EU because many US health care providers
and payors are excluded from its terms. The Privacy Shield is currently an option
only for organizations subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC or the Department of
Transportation.125 Insurance companies in the USA are regulated primarily by state
insurance commissioners and are not generally subject to enforcement by the FTC.126
The FTC’s jurisdiction also does not generally extend to nonprot entities.127 Health
care providers, hospitals, and other care organizations that operate on this basis may be
excluded from the Shield’s framework entirely.128
When available, the Shield places asymmetric burdens on researchers in medicine,
public health and social care in the USA. Under the GDPR, EU controllers of all
types can process sensitive health data for purposes of treatment, social care, public
health, or medical research as an independent lawful basis.129 They need not obtain
the specic consent of the subject or o er mechanisms to withdraw that consent.130
(Ethics regimes may impose independent consent requirements, but these do not
necessarily providedata subjectswith anoption forwithdrawal).131This is a substantial
advantage for administering complicated, multiyear clinical studies. Controllers in the
USA, by contrast, must comply under the Privacy Shield with detailed and untested
requirements for explicit consent fromdata subjects even for public health andmedical
research uses.132 The Privacy Shield o ers only a very narrow exception for process-
(2019) (US government formal commitments in Privacy Shield represent de jure law rather than informal
commitments).
124 Third ReviewWorking Document supra note 109 at 10–12.
125 Nahra, supra note 105.
126 Id.
127 SeeLetter fromFederal TradeCommissionChairwomanEdithRamirez 2 (Jul. 7, 2016), attached asAnnex
IV, Commission Implementing Decision supra note 4 at L207/79.
128 Id.
129 GDPRArt. 6 (setting out lawful bases for processing, including consent and research in the public interest),
9.1 (h)(i)& (j) (allowing use of sensitive personal data for reasons of health or social care, protecting public
health and for scientic research regardless of the non-prot status of the processor); recital 159 (“For
the purposes of this Regulation, the processing of personal data for scientic research purposes should
be interpreted in a broad manner including for example technological development and demonstration,
fundamental research, applied research and privately funded research.”)
130 GDPR Art. 6, 7 (providing obligations required only when the lawful basis for processing is consent), &
9.1 (h)(i) & (j). See also GDPR Recitals 51–54; see also Ciara Staunton, Santa Slokenberga & Deborah
Mascalzoni, The GDPR and the research exemption: considerations on the necessary safeguards for
research biobanks, 27 Eur J HumGenetics 1159, 1161 (2019) (noting the wide scope of GDPR’s research
exemption).
131 See Staunton, Slokenberga &Mascalzoni, supra note 131 at 1160.
132 Like the GDPR, the Privacy Shield does not dene what constitutes adequate notice and consent when
future researchuses cannot be specied in advance. Privacy Shield Supplemental Principles, Pharmaceutical
and Medical Products at b(i) & (ii). However, unlike the GDPR, which contains broad research and
healthcare exemptions from consent requirements, the Privacy Shield has only a narrow exception from
consent requirements for medical research purposes. Compare Privacy Shield Supplemental Principles,
Sensitive Data a(iii) & (iv) (exempting organization’s from armative consent requirements for sensitive
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ing for direct ‘medical care and diagnosis’ or for research specically by ‘non-prot
entities’.133 Many US health providers and some research institutions operate as for-
prots. Those that do operate as nonprots are outside the jurisdiction of the FTC,
and probably cannot make use of the Shield framework and its research exceptions at
all. Thepractical impact of these additional restrictions is to imposeheavier compliance
burdens on US research entities than on their EU counterparts, and so to hinder cross-
border research and innovation. 134 On the other hand, where use without consent for
research purposes is allowed, the Privacy Shield contains none of the additional orga-
nizational and technological safeguards for such data that are set out in the GDPR.135
The Privacy Shield is therefore both unduly burdensome on US health research and
unduly lenient on actual patient protections when health data are used.
Health service providers and researchers are caught in the uncertainty surrounding
the Privacy Shield even though the concerns targeted by Privacy Shield are tangential
to healthcare treatment and research. Long-term health and treatment data have little
direct utility in preventing terrorist attacks, and US law enforcement and national
security agencies have shown little interest in monitoring it. Although there is concern
over search engines, platforms, and online retailers gaining personal health data, theUS
domestic medical privacy law, HIPAA, could be employed to address those concerns
in the samemanner as theGDPR.Meanwhile, as discussed in Part I, there is a wealth of
relatively uncomplicated transfers for the purposes of storage, analysis, and treatment
services that are unnecessarily complicated by the theatrics surrounding the Privacy
Shield’s viability. If the Privacy Shield andSCC frameworks are struck downor hobbled
in the Schrems II decision, the need for an independent basis under which to transfer
health data to the USA will become even more urgent.
IV. ESTABLISHINGAHIPAA SHIELD
In Section IV we argue that one way to overcome the problems with the EU–US
Privacy Shield for transfers of health datawould be to request a sector specic adequacy
decision. Many in the health sector advocate for a sector-specic solution to allow
research transfers of data to proceed internationally.136 We support such e orts, and
suspect an option is available that has been overlooked. The USA has already signaled
its agreement with many of the GDPR principles as applied to data concerning health.
TheUS has an existing health data protection law, the Privacy Rule promulgated under
data only when it is required to providemedical care or diagnosis or for research carried out by a non-prot
entity) with GDPR Art 9.1 (h)(i) & (j) (providing independent legal bases for use of sensitive personal
data for reasons of health or social care, protecting public health and for scientic research regardless of the
non-prot status of the processor). See also Nahra, supra note 105 (use of sensitive information in research
will depend on providing appropriate notice and choice in the rst instance under the Privacy Shield).
133 Privacy Shield Principles, supra note 68 Supplemental Principles, Sensitive Data a(iii) & (iv); GDPR Art
9.1 (h)(i) & (j).
134 Compare Privacy Shield Principles supra note 68 at § 4 with GDPR Art 9.1 (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), 9.3 &
89 (setting out lawful bases for processing of sensitive data, including health data, such as when in the
substantial public interest, for the provision of health or social care subject to safeguards, in the interest
of public health, or for scientic research subject to safeguards). See also GDPR Recitals 51–54.
135 E.g. GDPRArt 6.4 (setting out organizational and technical measures thatmust be followedwhen the basis
for processing is research in the public interest).
136 See, e.g.,ColinMitchell, JohanOrdish&AlisonHall,GenomicMedicine and research: howdoes theGDPR
apply?, at 3, 23 phg foundation available at www.phgfoundation.org (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
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the HIPAA,137 that could serve as the basis for a sector-specic adequacy decision. A
health sector ‘shield’ based on HIPAA’s Privacy Rule would not replace the EU–US
privacy shield, nor SCCs, BCRs, or informed consent. It would be an additional legal
basis for lawful international transfer of personal health data. In this section we outline
(i) the advantages that the HIPAA shield would have over the EU–US privacy shield.
We also discuss (ii) whether HIPAA would likely meet the ‘adequacy’ standard, and
(iii) the modications that are likely to be required.
The US legal framework for certain kinds of private information, such as health
information, is not dissimilar to that of the EU. The USA has had a comprehensive
medical data privacy regulation since 2002, when HIPAA’s Privacy Rule was promul-
gated by the Department of Health and Human Services.138 The regulation’s initial
reach was quite narrow; it originally prescribed privacy and patient data security rules
only for ‘covered entities’, including clinicians, health care facilities, pharmacies, health
insurance plans, and health care clearinghouses.139 The 2009 HITECH Act extended
its reach to cover practices of companies working with covered entities—‘business
associates’ in the law’s parlance—and also challenges arising from electronic health
records.140 Together with the administrative regulations promulgated under these
Acts,141 the HIPAA Privacy Rule has proved a functional and balanced approach to
privacy of medical records and personal health data.142
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule contains many similarities to the GDPR. Under HIPAA,
as under the GDPR, use or disclosure of personal information is forbidden unless
the subject explicitly consents or a specic exception applies.143 Covered entities
may freely use and disclose personal information without prior permission for treat-
ment, payment, operations, and certain public benet activities such as research or
law enforcement activities.144 These exceptions are similar to GDPR’s list of lawful
bases for processing such as vital interests of the subject, performance of a contract, a
task carried out in the public interest, or the legitimate interests of the processor.145
As under the GDPR, specic consent must be obtained before using or disclosing
personal health information in a situation that is not one of the listed exceptions.146
137 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104–191, §§ 261–64,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (“HIPAA”).
138 Standards for Privacy of Individually IdentiableHealth Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002).
139 I. Glenn Cohen &Michelle D. Mello, HIPAA and Protecting Health Information in the 21st Century, 320
JAMA 231, 231 (2018).
140 Health InformationTechnology for Economic andClinicalHealthAct, Pub. L.No. 111–5, § 13001–13424,
at 13401, 123 Stat. 227-279, at 260 (2009) codied at 42 U.S.C. 17931.
141 Standards for Privacy of Individually IdentiableHealth Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000);
Standards for Privacy of Individually IdentiableHealth Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 12, 2002);
Privacy of Individually Identiable Health Information, 45 CFR §§ 164.500–164.534.
142 Cohen &Mello, supra note 140 at 231.
143 45C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1); see alsoU.S. Dept. ofHealth andHuman Services, Summary ofHIPAAPrivacy
Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html. (“Amajor pur-
pose of the Privacy Rule is to dene and limit the circumstances in which an individual’s protected heath
informationmaybeusedor disclosedby covered entities. A covered entitymaynot use or disclose protected
health information, except either: (1) as the Privacy Rule permits or requires; or (2) as the individual who
is the subject of the information (or the individual’s personal representative) authorizes in writing.”).
144 StaceyA.Torvino, TheHIPAAPrivacyRule and the EUGDPR, 47 SetonHall L. Rev. 973, 982–83 (2017).
145 GDPR Art. 6(1).
146 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.508(a)(1) .
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HIPAA denes Protected Health Information (PHI) broadly to include any health-
related information that can be used to identify a particular individual.147 This can
be information related to an individual’s past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition, any provisions of healthcare to an individual, and any past, present,
or future payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual.148 This scope is
similar to the denition of Data Concerning Health under the GDPR.149 The HIPAA
Privacy Rule does not dene ‘authorization’ in the same detail that the GDPR denes
consent, but both laws require notice and transparency to the subject about specic
uses for consent to be considered valid.150 Both laws require additional disclosures and
safeguards before individual data can be used for ‘marketing’ purposes.151 Under both
frameworks, individuals have a right to withdraw consent, although this right is less
robust under HIPAA.152 Both frameworks require use of technical and organizational
measures to protect the security of data concerning health, although in the case of
HIPAA, this rule applies only to records kept in electronic form.153
The main di erence between the GDPR and HIPAA is HIPAA’s narrower appli-
cation. Where the GDPR governs any entity that processes personal information of
EU subjects, HIPAA applies only to regulated health care entities such as clinicians,
hospitals, and insurance companies.154 It also permits disclosure of PHI to ‘business
associates’ of covered entities subject to contractual restrictions ensuring appropriate
use and storage.155 Business associates covered by the Privacy Rules are persons or
organizations that provide legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation,
management, administrative, accreditation, or nancial services to a covered entity.156
A business associate processing personal health data covered by the HIPAA Privacy
Rule must do so under prescribed terms. Covered health entities must impose through
agreements with their business associates (i) obligations to use protected data only
as permitted under the contract and (ii) appropriate safeguards to prevent unautho-
rized use or disclosure.157 Under 2009 amendments, business associates and their
147 45C.F.R. § 160.103 (2016) (denition of Individually IdentiableHealth Information&ProtectedHealth
Information).
148 Id.
149 GDPR Article 4(1).
150 GDPR Article 4(11).
151 Torvino, supra note 145 at 989.
152 45 CFR § 164.508(b) & (c); EU GDPR Art 7 § 3. Note that this right is more limited under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, and patients under HIPAA have no ‘right to erasure’ as under the GDPR. Torvino, supra note
145 at 988, 991.
153 Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information, 45 C.F.R. Subpart C §
164.302 et. seq.;GDPRArt. 32. State laws governing condentiality ofmedical information could also apply
in the U.S.
154 HIPAA § 262(a) ("Any standard adopted under this part shall apply, in whole or in part, to the following
persons: ’(1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health care provider who transmits any
health information in electronic form in connectionwith a transaction referred to in section 1173(a)(1)."’);
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,918. See generally
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918 & 59,924
(proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codied at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160–64) (explaining that HHS did not directly
regulate any entity that was not a covered entity in the Privacy Rule because it did not have the statutory
authority to do so).
155 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308(b)(1)–(3), 164.314(a)(1)–(2).
156 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 denition of ‘business associate’.
157 45 CFR 164.504(e).
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subcontractors can be held directly liable for breach of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule.158
HIPAA’s reach is narrower than the GDPR but it provides strict, GDPR-like rules for
an important subsection of the US economy.
A. Advantages of Sector-Specic Adequacy Under HIPAA
Pursuing an adequacy determination based on HIPAA has several advantages. For the
USA, an adequacy determination would allow transfers of data without continued
oversight and monitoring by the EU. US health companies could obey one set of rules
and need only submit to the jurisdiction of one set of regulators. Given the similarities
between the two frameworks for healthcare, the process to obtain adequacy based on
HIPAA could be relatively quick. Tailoring privacy rules to a sector where there is
already substantial convergence in values and approach will allow for easier resolution
of new policy challenges specic to the health sector, such as consent for follow on
research studies, or the meaning of anonymization in the case of biometric data. Such
a resolution can provide a useful model to other non-EU countries who may lack the
resources to develop comprehensive data regulation but want to preserve open data
exchanges for critical sectors.
The main advantage of an adequacy determination is that it will greatly simplify
exchanges of health data critical for care, treatment, research, services, and public
health.Once a country or an individual sector is deemed ‘adequate’ by the EC, personal
data may then be transferred from EU Member States without additional guarantees
or constant monitoring being necessary.159 Under the GDPR, the only continuing
assessment required are periodic reviews at least every four years.160 US entities would
benet because theywould need to complywith only onewell-establishedPrivacyRule
about patient data. They could save the considerable costs of annual self-certication
under a second, conicting regime at continual risk of being struck down.
Second, a limited HIPAA-based ‘shield’ would be managed and maintained by US
regulators without undue interference from Brussels. US citizens would be equally
entitled to its protections, and US enforcement e orts would not be inappropriately
tilted toward EU citizens. The legislature writing the rules would have democratic
accountability to both the data subjects and the a ected businesses. Legislative com-
petition between the US and the EU, both for healthcare and for sectors outside
the HIPAA shield, could promote legal innovation in response to rapidly changing
technologies and business models.
Third, pursuing a sector-based adequacy determination is achievable in the short
term, whereas e orts to cra a comprehensiveUS privacy regime could take years. The
US has pursued a sector-based approach to data protection because little consensus
exists outside certain elds about what kinds of rules should govern uses of consumer
data. Where states have lled in the gaps with their own comprehensive schemes,
158 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, § 13401, 123 Stat. at 260.
159 Mark Phillips, International data-sharing norms: from the OECD to the General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR), 137HumGenet. 575, 562 (2018) (“Because the decisions generally cover legal frameworks
of general application, in these situations virtually no extra e ort is required to operationalize adequacy as
justication.”)
160 GDPR Art. 45(3).
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such as the new California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA),161 they have drawn
intense opposition from the retail and technology industries.162 Business lobbies are
now more amenable to the idea of a federal bill, if only to displace the stricter GDPR-
like rules of the CCPA.163 All of the federal bills are still in early stages of consideration
and would face concentrated opposition in both houses of Congress before becoming
law.164 Should a scheme acceptable to US industry be enacted, it is unlikely it would
be stringent enough to meet the EU denition of adequacy.165 Even the CCPA itself,
which represents the vanguard of general US privacy legislation, is narrow in some
respects. It is a consumer protection statute that governs only large businesses and
those holding large amounts of consumer data of the residents of one state.166 It allows
the transfer and sale, even of sensitive data, to third parties for any purpose unless
consumers armatively ‘opt-out’.167 The CCPA also permits di erential pricing and
services to be o ered to consumers who opt-out, unlike the GDPR, so long as the
di erence is ‘reasonably related to the value to the business provided to the business by
the consumer’s data’.168 In contrast, one sector of the USA, healthcare, already obeys
comprehensive GDPR-like rules. A limited healthcare adequacy ruling could provide
an end-run around the US legislative logjam.
In addition to being procedurally easier to achieve, a privacy regime tailored to
healthcare data is likely to be superior substantively at responding to new challenges
and legal gray areas specic to the sector. The era of ‘big data’ and the use of large
datasets to train algorithms to tailor products and services creates regulatory chal-
lenges throughout the economy. However, regulatory responses arguably should di er
between retailers and hospitals because the public benet calculus between research
enabling personalized medicine, for example, is di erent than the calculus underly-
ing the development of personalized advertising. Health-specic gray areas, such as
whether initial consent for research allows for use of personal health information innew
and unanticipated projects, or how tomeasure whether a patient dataset has truly been
anonymized, are easier to solve when the context is limited to the already highly regu-
lated health sector. The hardest cases, which surround tracking by unregulated internet
platforms, device companies, and online retailers, can be le for further negotiation
without interrupting research and development for human health. International bodies
already exist to coordinate harmonized approaches to health challenges and regularly
161 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100–1798.199
162 See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, Tech Lobbyists Push to Defang California’s Landmark Privacy Law, WIRED
4/29/2019 available at https://www.wired.com/story/california-privacy-law-tech-lobby-bills-weaken/
(last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
163 See, e.g. David McCabe, Congress and Trump Agreed They Want a National Privacy Law. It Is Nowhere
in Sight. NY Times (Oct. 1, 2019) (reporting that industry groups oodedWashington urging Congress to
pass a national privacy law to supersede and neutralize any state legislation on the issue).
164 MuzeFazlioglu,Tracking the politics ofUSprivacy legislation, Intl. Assoc. of PrivacyPractitioners (Dec. 13,
2019) available at https://iapp.org/news/a/tracking-the-politics-of-federal-us-privacy-legislation/ (last
visited Dec. 16, 2019).
165 E.g. McCabe supra note 164 (noting lack of consensus over a right for consumers to bring an action for
violations, which has been considered an important safeguard in EU adequacy determinations).
166 CCPA § 1798.140(c).120. The CCPA also specically excludes health data covered by HIPAA and similar
state laws from its scope. CCPA § 1798.145(c).
167 CCPA § 1798.120.
168 CCPA §§ 1798.120 & 1798.125.
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issue guidance for global health regulators.169 A sector-specic privacy regime can
more quickly adapt such guidance without drawing opposition from other, unrelated
sectors of the economy.
Finally, a sector-specic approacho ers a usefulmodel for other regions that hope to
collaboratewith the EUonhealthcare andmedical research butwhomay have di erent
regulatory priorities regarding the balance between safeguarding privacy and promot-
ing economic and technological development.170 India is an example of a country with
a thriving cloud-computing sector that may wish to provide data management services
to healthcare providers in the EU and the USA.171 It also has a di erent historical
approach to individual rights, and, as a developing economy, may have di erent priori-
ties with respect to the balance between privacy and economic development.172 Many
developing economies may not want to allocate resources to policing data privacy,
nor would their existing law enforcement sectors be well-suited to such a task.173
A limited sector-specic approach to data protection can promote important interna-
tional harmonization in healthcare, a eld where harmonization is urgently needed,174
while still allowing developing economies to pursue comprehensive regulatory reform
at their own pace.175
B. Is HIPAA Adequate Under the GDPR?
1. The Adequacy Test
For the level of protection in a third country to be considered adequate under the
GDPR, it must o er guarantees to the data subject ‘essentially equivalent’ to those
o ered in the EU.176 Themeans of protection, howevermay di er from that in the EU,
so long as they prove as e ective in practice.177 The objective is not to mirror point by
169 See, e.g., David Birnbaum et al., Revisiting public health informatics: patient privacy concerns, 23 Int’l J.
Health Governance 149, 150 (2018) (noting the role of the World Health Organization in establishing
internationally harmonized conceptual framework for healthcare information systems generally); Menno
Mostert et al., Big Data in medical research and EU data protection law: challenges to the consent or
anonymise approach, 24 Eur. J. Hum. Genetics 956, 959 (2016) (noting that initiatives within the medical
research community to coordinate the development of harmonised approaches to research and privacy
concerns are vital); Staunton et al., supra note 131 at 1159.
170 SeeMattoo&Meltzer, supranote39at 5 (noting that countries di er inhowmuch they valuepublic services
and economic activity that erode individual privacy).
171 Id. at 14.
172 Id. at 5, 14–15
173 See, e.g., Alex BonifaceMakulilo, Data Protection Regimes in Africa: too far from the European ‘adequacy’
standard? 3 Int. Data Privacy L. 42, 48 (2013) (noting the concerns of the EU evaluator judging the
adequacy of the Tunisian privacy regime that the Tunisian data protection authorities were not suciently
independent from the regular police agencies.).
174 Birnbaum, supra note 170 at 152.
175 Cf. Stoddart et al., supra note 30 at 151 (noting that holding everyone to GDPR gold-standard is
problematic for legal pluralism, developing countries, and legal innovation).
176 GDPR rec. 104; Schrems I supra note 3 at ¶ 73 (holding that “while the term ’adequate’ cannot require a
third country to ensure a level of protection identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order, ... [it still]
must be understood as requiring the third country in fact to ensure, by reason of its domestic law or its
international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is essentially
equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read in the light
of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union].”)
177 Schrems I, supra note 3 at ¶ 74.
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point the European legislation, but to establish the essential core requirements of that
legislation.178
This inquiry has a substantive and procedural component.179 The EC evaluates the
text of rules applicable to personal data transferred to a third country or an international
organization, and also the system in place to ensure the e ectiveness of such rules.180
Beyond the data protection regime itself, the EC also considers contextual factors such
as the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legisla-
tion, the existence and e ective functioning of one or more independent supervisory
authorities, and the international commitments the third country or international orga-
nization has entered into.181 Since 1995, only 12 countries have been found adequate
under this standard.
Although this may seem a high bar, the EC has been willing to apply the adequacy
standard in a exible and pragmatic manner.182 In 2003, the EC found Argentina to
have an adequate level of protection even though its data protection law was brand
new, and its DPA was not yet in existence.183 To observers, the nding seemed a
reward to Argentina for enacting a comprehensive EU-style data protection law when
such regimes were relatively rare, especially in Latin America.184 Similar pragmatic
considerations may have inuenced the recent adequacy decision for Japan, which
was able to obtain a coveted adequacy determination based on promises of future
enforcement notwithstanding a largely symbolic track record in fact.185 A respected
third country in a strategically important regionwilling to enter into a ‘privacy dialogue’
with the EU is likely to nd a receptive collaborator.186
Also important to the EC in measuring adequacy has been the signicance of a
trading partner, both commercially and in terms of geographic or cultural ties to the
EU.187 The history of the development of the Safe Harbor and the Privacy Shield
programs with the USA, the EU’s largest trading partner, shows the EU bending over
backward to nd a way to preserve data ows with the USA, while gaining just enough
178 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Adequacy Referential (updated), WP 254 at 2 (6 Feb. 2018)
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=614108.
179 Id. at 3.
180 Id. at 3.
181 GDPR Art. 45(2).
182 See Schwartz, supra note 124 at 786.
183 CommissionDecision of 30 June 2003 pursuant toDirective 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the adequate protection of personal data in Argentina (2003/490/EC) at P14 (noting that
a data protection authority had only just been constituted).
184 Schwartz, supra note 124 at 806; EuropeanCommissionMemo/17/15,Digital SingleMarket –Communi-
cation onExchanging and Protecting PersonalData in aGlobalisedWorldQuestions andAnswers ( Jan. 10,
2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-15_en.htm; see also Stoddart et al. supra note
30 at 147 .
185 Graham Greenleaf, Japan’s Proposed EU Adequacy Assessment: Substantive Issues and Procedural Hur-
dles, 154 Privacy Laws & Bus. Int’l Report 1, 10 (2018), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/U
NSWLRS/2018/53.html.
186 Schwartz, supra note 124 at 806-07; European Commission Memo/17/15, Digital Single Market – Com-
munication on Exchanging and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World Questions and Answers
( Jan. 10, 2017) (noting EU’s willingness to pursue a ‘dialogue on adequacy’ with pioneer countries),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-15_en.htm.
187 European CommissionMemo/17/15, supra note 187.
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commitments to appease lawmakers at home.188 Similar motivations helped push the
adequacy evaluations of Canada and New Zealand over the line even though inves-
tigators found some aws in both regimes.189 Where a third country has signicant
commercial and cultural ties to the EU, these considerations can outweigh a few gaps
in the data protection template.190
The EDPB, formerly known as the WP 29, has explicitly noted in its guidance on
adequacy determinations that, for some countries, a sector-based nding of adequacy
will be sucient. The EDPB recognized that requiring blanket GDPR-like coverage
in every case risked discriminating against divergent legal systems and so violating
international trade rules.191 For example, nationswith a federalist constitutional system
have limited authority to impose uniform standards. For this reason the EDPB has
cautioned that ‘a positive nding on adequacy should not in principle be limited to
countries having horizontal data protection laws, but should also cover specic sectors
within countries where data protection is adequate, even though in other sectors the
same country’s protection may be less than adequate’.192 The same report singled out
the USA as a jurisdiction where a sector-based enquiry might be suitable.193
2. HIPAA Is Adequate
Based on this guidance, HIPAA has a chance of earning an adequacy determina-
tion because it contains the core requirements of the GDPR. The Privacy Rule is
comprehensive in substance. As noted above, it is largely on all fours with the GDPR
with respect to use and disclosure of sensitive health data. With respect to the fun-
damental privacy principles under GDPR Article 5, HIPAA can be said to embody
the principles of lawfulness, transparency,194 purpose limitation,195 data minimiza-
tion,196 accuracy,197 security198, condentiality, and accountability.199 Although the
US lacks an independent data enforcement agency generally, the HIPAA Privacy Rule
is enforced by an independent oce, the Oce of Civil Rights (OCR), within the
Department of Health and Human Services. Comprehensive administrative and judi-
188 Schwartz, supra note 124 at 804–05.
189 Paul Roth, Adequate level of data protection’ in third countries post-Schrems and under the General Data
Protection Regulation, 25 J.L. Inf. & Sci. 49, 61 (2017); Stoddart et al. supra note 30 at 147–49.
190 Roth, supra note 190 at 60.
191 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Transfers
of personal data to third countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU data protection directive WP 12
DGXVD/5025/98 (Adopted by theWorking Party on 24 Jul 1998) at 26.
192 Id. at 27.
193 Id. at 26.
194 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2016) (permitting certain uses of information aer notice and consent by patients);
§ 164.508(a)(1) (requiring written patient authorization for certain uses); § 164.508(c)(2) (regulating
information disclosure to patients); § 164.524 (right of access), §164.526(a)(1) (right of rectication).
195 Id. at §§ 164.502-164.514 (permitted bases for use of health data).
196 Id. at §§ 164.502(b) and 164.514 (d) (A covered entity must make reasonable e orts to use, disclose, and
request only the minimum amount of protected health information needed to accomplish the intended
purpose.)
197 Id. at §§ 164.524 & 164.526(a)(1) (rights to access and rectication).
198 Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)
et. seq.
199 Pub. L. 104-191; 42 U.S.C. §1320d-5, §1320d-6 (setting out civil and criminal penalties for non-
compliance).
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cial remedies, including monetary penalties, are available in the event of a breach.200
The OCR has an established and extensive track record of investigating and resolving
privacy-related complaints and issues. In contrast to FTC enforcement actions under
the Safe Harbor, which totaled 11 cases in its rst 13 years and only 39 overall,201
OCR investigates and resolves tens of thousands of complaints every year.202 It also
conducts proactive audits of covered entities and their business associates to ensure
compliance.203 In 2009, the OCR’s enforcement authority was extended directly to
reach ‘business associates’ who provide services to covered entities.204 Enforcement at
the federal level is complemented by state laws protecting against discrimination based
on genetic data.205
A nding of adequacy is also more likely because the exchange of health data
between US and EU entities is commercially and culturally important to both regions.
Together the USA and the UK spend more on healthcare research and development
than all of the otherOECDnations combined.206 TheUSAand its research institutions
are members of and comply with all of the major international bodies and conventions
surrounding ethics and good clinical practice in healthcare and research.207 Coopera-
tion specic to research and care therefore poses minimal risk to EU patients. Greater
global harmonization in healthcare information is a priority and need not wait for
harmonization of practices across all industries.
To be sure, the EU is likely to require some alterations. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule is
nearly 20 years old and needs updating.208 The EC is likely to require a private right of
action for individual data subjects, at least those from theEU.209 Itmay also seek greater
200 45C.F.R. §§ 160.304-404;Oce of Civil Rights, Department of Health andHuman ServicesHealth Infor-
mation Privacy: Enforcement Highlights, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-e
nforcement/data/enforcement-highlights/index.html (visited Feb. 25, 2020).
201 Anna Myers, FTC Enforcement of The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework 5, https://iapp.org/media/pdf/
resource_center/IAPP_FTC_SH-enforcement.pdf
202 Oce of Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human Services Health Information Privacy: Enforce-
ment Results by Year, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/e
nforcement-results-by-year/index.html (visited Feb. 26, 2020).
203 Oce of Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human Services, Health Information Privacy, HIPAA
Privacy, Security, and Breach Notication Audit Program, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
compliance-enforcement/audit/index.html (visited Feb. 26, 2020).
204 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, § 13401, 123 Stat. at 260; see also
78 FR 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013).
205 Ellen Wright Clayton et al., The law of genetic privacy: applications, implications, and limitations, J. L.
Biosci. 1, 12–13 (2019).
206 See Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, Global public funding of health R&D, https://
www.abpi.org.uk/facts-and-gures/science-and-innovation/global-public-funding-of-health-rd/ (last
visited Feb. 26, 2020) (collecting statistics through 2017 from the OECD STAN database (Science,
Technology and Patents)).
207 E.g. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD Privacy Framework (2013)
‘Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Data Flows of Personal Data’, available
at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/privacy-guidelines.htm(accessed 19Dec. 2019); see also 4th
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuti-
cals forHumanUse, ICHHarmonisedTripartiteGuideline, ‘Guideline forGoodClinical Practice E6 (R1)’,
10 Jun. 1996, available at:<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s22154en/s22154en.pdf>.
208 See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech, and Protecting Patient Privacy, 322
JAMA 1141, 1141 (2019) (“HIPAA is a 20th-century statute ill equipped to address 21st-century data
practices.”).
209 WP 254, supra note 179 at 8.
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commitments on onward transfer by business associates.210 As discussed in Part IV.C
below, more rigorous denitions of consent for further use may be required.
TheEC’s adequacydetermination forCanada,which is limited to commercial sector
data processing, provides an indication for how the EC might approach the compli-
cations of a sector-specic adequacy ruling. In the Canadian case the relevant data
protection legislation applied initially only to private sector organizations regulated
by the federal government and was scheduled to come into broader e ect in three
stages.211 There was some complexity around health data as well as the interplay of
the Canadian legislation and laws enacted by specic provinces that might supersede
the federal law. Rather than demand that all of the potential inconsistencies be resolved,
the EDPBOpinion forCanada noted approvingly the establishment of federal working
groups tasked with pursuing harmonization across federal, provincial, and territorial
governments and public and private sector organizations.212 This approach suggests
that the EDPB and the EC are comfortable with sector-specic adequacy determina-
tions so long as competent and e ective domestic agencies are available to address
inconsistencies and boundary issues. Within the USA, the relevant agency could be
the Department of Health and Human Services, the FTC, a combination of both, or
a specialized body empowered to bring together public and private stakeholders to
achieve consensus.TheECcouldmonitor ongoing compliance, aswith every adequacy
determination, under Article 45 of the GDPR.
3. Clarication and Improvement of HIPAA and GDPR for Health Data
A virtue of a sustained dialog between the USA and the EU on health data privacy
is that the two regions could clarify several gray areas under both HIPAA and the
GDPR. For example, theGDPRhas generous exceptions from consent andwithdrawal
requirements for research; however it is not clear to what extent commercial entities
may rely on these exceptions when they conduct healthcare research.213 Similarly,
under HIPAA, covered entities are permitted to provide data to business associates for
‘data aggregation’ and analysis.214 It is not clear though whether such analysis has to be
related to the services provided to the covered entity or if the business associate may
210 SeeKevinCoy&Neil Ho man PhD, BigData Analytics UnderHIPAA, JDSUPRAMar. 16, 2016 available
at www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/bid-data-analytics-under-hipaa-80678 (last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (per-
mitted onward disclosure by business associates for ‘management and administration’ purposes is unclear
under Privacy Rule).
211 Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided by the Canadian Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (2002/2/EC), 2002 O.J. (L 2/13) at ¶¶ 5–7.
212 Opinion 2/2001 of the EDPB on the adequacy of the Canadian Personal Information and Electronic
Documents Act—WP 39 of 26 Jan. 2001 4-6 available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/e
n/media/dataprot/wpdocs/index.htm. (recommending that the ECmonitor the activities of these groups
and “encourage . . . initiatives that will foster coherence of rules throughout Canada”).
213 GDPR recital 159 (research exception includes not only fundamental and applied research, but also
privately funded research.); see also W. Nicholson Price et al., Shadow Health Records Meet New Data
Privacy Laws, Science vol. 363, 448, 450 (Feb 1, 2019); Chih-Hsing Ho, Challenges of the EU General
Data Protection Regulation for Biobanking and Scientic Research, 25 J.L. Inf. Sci. 84, 91, 98 (2017).
214 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Standards for Privacy of Individually Identiable Health
Information. Final Privacy Rule Preamble, Section 164.504(e) 65 Federal Register 82461, 82505 (Dec. 28,
2000) (codied at 45 C.F.R. 160–164).
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use personal health information for their own commercial data-analytic purposes.215
Greater clarity under both laws about the boundary between research and care in
the public interest, on the one hand, and secondary commercial research that should
require additional consent, on the other, would be benecial.216 Both regimes also
exempt anonymized or ‘deidentied’ health data from any restrictions. A common
denition of e ective anonymization in health data would be welcome on both sides
of the Atlantic.217
Furtherdiscussion could also clarify thedenitionof ‘specic and informedconsent’
in the context of healthcare research. Both HIPPA and the GDPR require that data
subjects receive information abouthow their datawill beused and, if an exemptiondoes
not apply, that they consent explicitly to any such use. This standard can be dicult to
apply in medical research, where personal data are expected to be available for linkage,
reuse, and analysis for largely undetermined future research purposes.218 Commenta-
tors have proposed a model of dynamic, ‘broad’ consent for scientic research where
participants authorize unspecied future medical research uses, but researchers must
seek ethics committee or some other form of representative participant committee
review for each new category of use.219 That way, the risks if reidentication or other
participant harms can be considered in real time and balanced against the benets of
the new use. On the ip side, the GDPR requires a stricter standard of consent where
subjects are asked to approve use of sensitive health data for purposes beside research
or care. If theUSAwere to adopt similar safeguards aroundmeaningful patient consent,
including rights of withdrawal and erasure outside of a care or bona de research
context, this would go a long way toward quieting fears about slippage of sensitive data
fromthe regulatedhealth sphere into themore rapacious commercial sector.220 Linking
the two healthcare data regimes through an adequacy assessment would pave the way
for common adoption of such standards.
C. ChallengesWith the Proposed Approach
Our recommendation for a HIPAA Shield is based two assumptions: (i) that the USA
is not poised to pass comprehensive data protection legislation in the near term and
(ii) that the US medical establishment will remain committed to following interna-
tional norms of patient condentiality and ethical practice. Given the wide divergence
between the EU and the USA on how to approach data privacy in most elds, but the
substantial convergence as to information governance in the healthcare eld, we think
that a HIPAA based Shield o ers the easiest and most promising way forward.
215 Coy &Ho man, supra note 211.
216 For discussion of how such a denition might be achieved, see infra text accompanying notes 228231.
217 See, e.g., Minssen, supra note 8 at 4546.
218 GDPR Recital 33 (“It is oen not possible to fully identify the purposes of personal data processing for
scientic research purposes at the time of data collection”); Mostert et al, supra note 170 at 2.
219 Ho, supra note 214 at 93; Minssen et al., supra note 10 at 17; Cohen & Mello, supra note 209 at 1142;
Melanie Bourassa Forcier, et al., Integrating Articial Intelligence into health care through data access: can
the GDPR act as a beacon for policymakers? J. L. Biosci. 317, 329 (2019).
220 See BBCNews, Project Nightingale: Google accesses trove of US patient data, https://www.bbc.co.uk/ne
ws/technology-50388464;Natasha Singer,WhenAppsGet YourMedicalData, Your PrivacyMayGoWith
It, NY Times Sept. 3 2019.
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A potential weakness of a HIPAA Shield is that the same concerns about US
government surveillance that underlie the cases against the Privacy Shield could also
sink a HIPAA Shield. The Snowden revelations concerned a program called Prism
that allowed the government to track online communications between US citizens
and foreign nationals.221 At present, there have not been credible reports of a similar
widespread data collection program for surveillance of healthcare records. However,
electronic health records are certainly exchanged electronically and so could be subject
to US government surveillance through the existing programs. These records are not
likely to be of much use for national security priorities at present, but as technolo-
gies develop and surveillance methods evolve, it is possible that health data held by
providers and researchers could become useful for such purposes. If EU controllers
have reason to believe that these data are likely to surveilled inappropriately by US
government authorities, the AG Opinion in Schrems II has suggested that they must
refuse the transfer notwithstanding the presence of a shield or other general legal
basis.222
A more immediate drawback to a sector-specic regime is that it would only apply
to certain custodians of information. Much information concerning health is collected
by companies and actors outside the healthcare eld, through apps, wearables, and
search requests and posts on social media.223 The GDPR protects the fundamental
rights of the data subject no matter who holds or processes the data. The US system
places no restriction on actors outside the health sector using such information to
track, monitor, and advertise to individuals based on intimate health details.224 This
kind of information may even lead to discrimination in employment or insurance if
businesses can easily reidentify subjects.225 Perhaps evenmore worrisome, the current
US administration in the process of proposing new rules that would require health care
providers to send full electronic medical records to third party apps aer a patient has
authorized the exchange.226 Patients may provide consent to such transfers without
fully understanding that once the records leave the care of an entity covered byHIPAA,
the information therein can be used for any purpose whatsoever.227 A comprehensive
rule like the GDPR that applies to all custodians of sensitive personal information,
rather than to only certain kinds of processors, is more protective. This is true but not
yet attainable in the USA. A Shield based on an enhanced version of HIPAA would be
an incremental rst step toward more comprehensive rights for individuals and details
221 Schrems I, supra note 3 at ¶¶ 14–15, 22, 28, 30.
222 Opinion of the Advocate General, supra note 47 at ¶¶ 128–139.
223 See Cohen &Mello, supra note 140 at 232; Price et al., supra note 214 at 449.
224 The CCPA places some limits on sale or transfer of such data, including inferences drawn from the data.
CCPA, at § 1798.140 (o)(1)(K). However, as noted, the consumer must armatively ‘opt-out’ of third-
party sale and collection. If a HIPAA Shield were adopted, it could strengthen consent protections to
require armative, specic and informed consent for follow-on use. It could also go beyond the GDPR
to include inferential data, as dened by the CCPA, as part of protected health care information that cannot
be processed without a lawful basis.
225 See Singer, supra note 221.
226 Center forMedicare andMedicaid Services, Trump Administration AnnouncesMyHealthEData Initiative
to Put Patients at the Center of the US Healthcare System, (Mar. 6, 2018) https://www.cms.gov/ne
wsroom/press-releases/trump-administration-announces-myhealthedata-initiative-put-patients-cente
r-us-healthcare-system (visited Feb. 27, 2020).
227 See Singer, supra note 221.
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about their health. As part of the adequacy process, the EC can require that enhanced
standards of consent apply to any patient authorization to disclosemedical record data.
Some have proposed that medical charities and data protection bodies in Europe
cra an overarching code of conduct or certication scheme under Article 40 of the
GDPR that is specic to using personal data, including genetic and biometric data, in
medical research.228 We support this idea, which has the benet of linking protection
to the type of data and use, rather than the type of organization undertaking the
processing. However, precisely because of the diversity of parties, interests and uses
that must be covered, draing and implementing such a code may be dicult. The
Biobanking and BioMolecular Resources Research Infrastructure-European Research
InfrastructureConsortiumhas beenworking on such a code just for Europe since 2017
but has yet to release a dra.229 Even if such a Code were approved, other regions
may object to following a Code monitored and overseen by a European supervisory
authority.230 An ‘adequacy’ approach that builds o  existing law in each region may
be politically easier to achieve. An optional code of conduct, developed among and
between an appropriately representative groupof stakeholders, could then sit alongside
sector-specic rules and provide guidance as to when onward transfers of medical data
from primary caregivers or research studies might be appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
International transfers of personal health data from the EU to theUSA are vital for con-
tinued innovation in public health and biomedicine. Uncertainty about the application
of the GDPR is threatening to unravel decades of productive research collaborations
and networks of international expertise. Researchers and patients on both sides of the
Atlantic require rules that protect the fundamental rights of individuals although also
allowing researchon treatments and therapeutics tomove forward as swily as possible.
The US–EU Privacy Shield cannot facilitate international transfers of medical data.
It is neither fully adequate under EU law, nor democratically legitimate under the
US legal system. Its scope is too narrow to allow for the kinds of frequent, large-
scale research transfers of medical data required for innovation in drug discovery,
personalized medicine, and new uses of AI in medical devices.
A HIPAA shield could o er a better approach that is tailored to use of data in
research and is simple to achieve in the near term. A comprehensive data protection
regime for the entireUSA is still years away. Building upon existing law in an areawhere
US and EU values fundamentally align is a pragmatic approach that sidesteps the most
contentious issues although advancing important public policy aims.
228 See, e.g.,Mitchell et al. supra note 41 at 3, 20; Phillips, supra note 8 at 33 (“An international code of conduct
could help investigators to overcome some of the current hurdles, as well as others that might arise as
legislation on data protection evolves.”).
229 A Code of Conduct for Health Research, http://code-of-conduct-for-health-research.eu, (visited Feb.
27, 2020); BBMRI-ERIC, Code of Conduct for Using Personal Data in Health Research, http://www.
bbmri-eric.eu/news-events/code-of-conduct-for-using-personal-data-in-health-research/ (visited Feb.
27, 2020).
230 EDPB Guidelines 1/2019 on Codes of Conduct andMonitoring Bodies under Regulation 2016/679 at p.
available at pp. 19-24 https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/les/consultation/edpb20190219_guidelines_
coc_public_consultation_version_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
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